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INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND THE LAW IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY,
By W. S. HOLDSWORTH*

F

ROM the middle of the fourteenth century onwards there is
authority for the principle that all persons ought to be allowed
to carry on their trades freely, subject only to any restrictions or
regulations which might be imposed by the common law or by
statute law. The law, it was said, gave to every man the right
to carry on his trade as he pleased, free from arbitrary restrictions not recognised by law, whether those restrictions were imposed by the illegal actions of officials of the local or central government, or by the lawless acts of rivals in trade. This general
principle of the common law was quite consistent with the recognition of the need for much legal regulation of many aspects of
trade in the interests of the state. And, since the state considered
that it was to its interest to impose many restrictions in order to
secure the honest manufacture of goods, skill in the workman, fair
prices, fair wages,' and many other restrictions in order to promote foreign trade,2 this general principle of the common law
tended to be comparatively unimportant in practice, as compared
with the detailed regulations made by the legislature. Occasionally, indeed, it emerges. It emerged, for instance, at the end of
Elizabeth's reign, when the indignation aroused by wholesale
grants of monopolies caused the Queen to leave the validity of

*Vinerian Professor of English Law in the University of Oxford;

Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
tA lecture delivered to the Holdsworth Club in the Faculty of Law of
Birmingham University on November 10, 1933.
12 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3rd ed., 468-9; 4 ibid. 318-19;
6 ibid. 346-9.
22 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3rd ed., 471-2; 4 ibid. 326
sqq.; 6 ibid. 323 sqq.
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those grants to be determined by the common law.3 But, though
the principle was always present to the minds of lawyers and
statesmen, and though it is assumed as a premise by the legislature,4 it was too vague and general a principle to emerge very
frequently in the courts.
At the end of the seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries,
it was brought into somewhat greater prominence, first by the
growth of the capitalistic organization of trade, and secondly by the
decadence or abolition of many of the old restrictions on the
freedom of trade, and particularly of the rules which regulated
prices and wages. These two allied phenomena led to the growth
of combinations of masters and men in particular trades, which
were formed to regulate such matters as prices, wages, and hours
of work; and there is no doubt that this general principle of the
common law led the lawyers to assert the illegality of these combinations and their activities. But in the eighteenth century this
general principle was again overshadowed by statutes which, in
pursuance of the general policy of the state to maintain some regulation of trade in the interests both of masters and men, penalized
these combinations in the particular trades in which they had made
their appearance. 5 It was not till the last year of the eighteenth
and the first year of the nineteenth century that the growing predominance of the capitalistic organization of trade, and the increase
in the number of these combinations owing to the repeal or disuse
of older laws passed in the interests of the workmen, induced
Parliament to pass the first general acts, against combinations,
first of men and then of masters. It was not till later in the
nineteenth century, and after the growing influence of the doctrine
of laissez faire preached by the economists had led to the repeal
of this legislation against combinations, 7 that any real stress was
laid upon this general principle of the common law. And then,
since it proved to be too vague to be satisfactory, it was soon
overshadowed by new legislation which has created the modern
law as to combinations and Trade Unions of masters and men.
Those are the conditions in which the law as to combinations
of masters and men grew up. I shall consider its development
Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3rd ed., 345-9.
4Below 11.55.
3
Below p. 382.
39 George II, ch. 87; 39, 40 George III, ch. 106; below p. 385-386.
75 George IV, ch. 95; 6 George IV, ch. 129.
34
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in the eighteenth century under the following three heads: (1) the
general theory of the common law and its application to these combinations; (2) the growth of combinations of masters and men
and their statutory regulation; (3) the social and economic effects of this statutory regulation of combinations of masters
and men.
(1) THE GENERAL THEORY OF THE COmmoN LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION TO COMBINATIONS OF MASTERS AND MEN.
"At common law," says Sir William Erle,8 "every person has
individually, and the public also have collectively, a right to require that the course of trade should be kept free from unreasonable obstruction." But this freedom allowed to every man engaged in trade "is compatible with countless restraints imposed
by law for the benefit of his fellow subjects individually, or of the
public generally, or of himself. The right to this freedom for the
capitalist and the working man is part of the right to property
and personal security, and is subject to analogous restraints."
This general theory of the common law that all persons ought
to be allowed to carry on their trades freely, subject to any restrictions or regulations which might be imposed by the law. can be
traced back to a very early period in Our legal history."0 The principle that trade should be free from arbitrary restraints is implied
in the clauses of Magna Carta which relate to the liberty of the
subject," and to trade;'12 and the medieval judges favoured the
principle, just as they favoured the principle of freedom of alienation, 3 because they were hostile to all arbitrary restrictions on persThe Law Relating to Trade Unions 6; Sir William Erle had been
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas; after his retirement he was made
chairman of the Commission on Trade Unions which was appointed in
1867; the book was originally written as a memorandum to guide his
colleagues on that commission.
DErle, The Law Relating to Trade Unions 44.
10Erle, The Law
Relating to Trade Unions 10.
']Coke, commenting on sec. 29 of 'agna
Carta (sec. 39 in the Charter
of 1215) which provides that no man is to be disseised of his "liberties,"
gives as an instance of its infringement, a case where the Merchant Taylors
Company had tried by an ordinance to infringe this principle of freedom of
trade, Coke, Second Instit. 47.
1-Sec. 30-as to foreign merchants.
133 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3rd ed.. 85; Coke, commenting on the rule that conditions restricting freedom of alienation are void.
says that such a condition is "against trade and traffique and bargaining and
contracting between man and man," Coke, Littleton 223a.
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sonal liberty, 14 or rights of property," for which no legal justification could be shown. In fact, from the medieval period onwards,
this general theory that trade ought to be free can be traced in
judicial decisions and dicta; it has, at different periods, given rise
to rules and doctrines intended to safeguard it; and, since the acts
of combinations of masters and men are generally more dangerous to it than the acts of individuals, the chief, though not the only,
means adopted by the common law to safeguard it has been an
application of the law of conspiracy.
If we look at the number and character of the medieval statutes which attempted to realize the moral ideal aimed at by the
Legislature-honest manufacture, a just price, a fair wage, a
reasonable profit,"0 it would seem at first sight to be difficult to
maintain that the common law favoured freedom of trade. But
it is not really difficult to maintain this thesis if we remember that,
as Sir William Erle pointed out,17 the freedom which the common
lawyers favoured was freedom from arbitrary restraints not sanctioned by the law, whether those restraints were imposed by the
voluntary acts of contracting parties-, or were imposed by persons
acting without legal authority. In Henry V's reign, Hull, J., was
prepared to treat a contract for a very moderate restraint of trade
not merely as an illegal contract, but as a criminal offence.'
In
one of the Books of Assizes a case is reported in which a Lombard, who tried to enhance the price of merchandize by spreading
false reports, was convicted and fined. 19 In another of the Books
of Assizes, amongst the matters as to which enquiry was to be
made by an inquest of office held by the court of King's Bench
were the misdeeds of forestallers of victuals, and of merchants
who "by covin and combination between themselves set, from
year to year, a certain price on wool for sale in the country, so
that none of them will buy or bid more than others in the purchase
of wool, beyond the fixed price' which they themselves have ordained, to the great impoverishment of the people."20 In Edward
Holdswortb, History of English Law, 3rd ed. 562; 5 ibid. 348.
"sFortescue, De Laudibus ch. 36; Coke, Second Instit. 63.
162 Eoldswortb, History of English Law, 3rd ed. 467.
17Above p. 371.
8
" Year Book, 2 Henry V Pasch. pl. 26.
142

1043
Ass. pl. 38.
0

- "Item des marchants que per covin et alliance entre eux d'an en an
mettent certein prise sur leins que sont a vendre en pais, issint que nul
d'eux achateront ne passeront auters en l'achate de leins oustre le certein
prise qu'eux, mesmes ont ordeign, a grand enpoverishment de people" etc.
27 Ass. pl. 44 (p. 139).
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III's reign the grant to one Peachey of the sole right to sell wine
in London was treated as an illegal grant, and his conduct in acting under it was made one of the articles of his impeachment. "'
Coke commented upon and emphasized all these medieval authorities ;22 and in this, as in other branches of legal doctrine, passed on
this medieval principle into the modern common law.
Il the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the crime of conspiracy was enlarged and generalized by the combined efforts of
the Star Chamber and the court of King's Bench. "3 It was extended to apply not only to all combinations to do acts which
amounted to a crime or a tort, but also to acts which were regarded
as illegal because they were contrary to public policy.*-4 It is clear
from the discussions in the common law courts as to the validity of
monopolies, which arose at the beginning of the seventeenth century,2

1

that the common law held firmly to the view that restrictions

on the freedom of trade were contrary to public policy, illegal unless they could be justified by a valid local custom, or by some
recognised principle of the common law; and it is clear from the
judgment of Parker, C. J., in the case of Mitchet v. Revnolds26
that, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the courts held
exactly the same view. Involuntary restrictions on the freedom of
trade were illegal, because they were contrary to public policy, unless they could be justified by a valid local custom or by the common law ;27 and voluntary restrictions on the freedom of trade, that
is contracts in restraint of trade, were likewise illegal because contrary to public policy,28 unless it could be proved that they were
reasonable as between the parties to them2 and not detrimental to
the public.30 In these circumstances it was inevitable that the courts
should hold that combinations of masters which were entered into
in order to force down wages or force up prices, or combinations of
212

22

Rotuli Parliamentorum 328.

The Poulterers Case, (1610) 9 Co. Rep. 55b, 56b; the Case of Monopo-

lies, (1602) 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 87a, 88a-b; cf. the argument of Coke, which
was accepted by the court, in the case of Davenant v. Hurdis, (1598) Moore,
K. B. 576. 579-80.
38 Holdsworth, History of English Law 378-9.
48 Holdsworth, History of English Law 381-2.
2 4 Holdsworth. History of English Law 349-53.
26(1711) 1 P. Wins. 181.
27(1711) 1 P. Wims. 181, 188-9.
28(1711) 1 P. Wins. 181, 192--"all contracts where there is a bare
restraint of trade and no more, must be void."
2-(1711) 1 P. Wms.181, 186, 191-2, 193.
30(1711) 1 P Wms. 181, 190.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

men which were entered into in order to force up wages or diminish
the length of the working day, were indictable conspiracies. These
combinations attempted to effect their objects by the pressure of
numbers, and so infringed the liberty of masters and men to
make what contracts they pleased. The case of R. v. Starling3'
was a case in which a combination of masters, to wit the brewers,
to so conduct their trade that the king's revenue was impoverished,
was held to be a criminal conspiracy, either on the ground that it
was a conspiracy to raise prices, or on the ground that it was
designed to bring pressure to bear on the government. 2 The case
of R. v. Cambridge Journeymen-Tailor33 was a case in which a
combination of men to refuse to work for less than a certain sum
per day was held to be an indictable conspiracy at common law,
34
so that the indictment need not conclude contra formam statuti.
It was only if a combination was entered into to effect some purpose permitted by law that it could be regarded as lawful. Thus
a combination to take legal proceedings to enforce a law which
imposed restrictions on the freedom of trade was lawful,33 and
31(1663) 1 Lev. 125, 1 Sid. 174, 1 Keb. 650.
32
The latter ground was the ground on which the court relied mainly,
(1664) 1 Sid. 174; and cf. the account of this case given in the argument
in R. v. Thorp, (1697) 5 Mod. 218, 224, Carth. 384, 1 Com. 27, Comb. 456,
Holt, K. B. 333 and in 1 Lev. 126; the former ground is hinted at in the
report in 1 Keb. 650, where it is said that "the very conspiracy to raise the
price of pepper is punishable, or of any other merchandize."
33(1721) 8 Mod. 10.
34
"The omission in not concluding this indictment contra formam
statuti is not material, because it is for a conspiracy, which is an offence
at common law. It is true, the indictment sets forth, that the defendants
refused to work under such rates, which were more than enjoined by the
statute . . . ; but yet these words will not bring the offence . . . to he
within that statute, because it is not the denial to work except for more
wages than is allowed by the statute, but it is for a conspiracy to raise their
wages for which these defendants are indicted," 8 Mod. 12; apart from the
statutes, the only ground upon which a conspiracy to raise wages could be
indictable was that such a conspiracy interfered with the freedom of trade;
Wright, Law of Criminal Conspiracies 55, says that "it is easy to understand how the established practice that indictments for conspiracy do not
conclude contra formam statuti even when they are founded on statutes may
have led to the impression that the criminality was independent of the
statutes;" but surely it is more natural to suppose that the established
practice was founded on the law that conspiracies of this sort were illegal
at common law because they interfered with the freedom of trade; and
this was the opinion of Crompton, J., in Hilton v. Eckersley, (1855) 6 E.
& B. 47, 53, 24 L. J. Q. B. 353, 25 L. T. 0. S. 214, 20 J. P. 4, 1 Jur.
N. S. 874, 3 C. L. R. 1415; affd. (1856) 6 E. & B. 66, cited below n. 42.
35
"No one seems to have questioned the legality of the 1811-13 outburst of combinations to prosecute masters who had not served an apprenticeship, or who were employing unapprenticed workmen," Webb, History
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also a combination to petition the King and Parliament to en force
or to alter the law. 36
In the eighteenth century the principle that a combination of
masters or men which interfered with the freedom of trade was a
criminal conspiracy harmonized well with the trend of economic
thought which favoured the removal of restraints on the conduct
of industry. In the middle of that century there had been considerable disturbance in the cotton trade.3 7 Thousands had left
work and had entered into combinations to raise wages. They had
appointed a committee, established boxes and appointed stewards
in every township to collect money to support weavers who had
been ordered to strike, and had been guilty of assaulting and
abusing weavers who refused to strike. Lord Mansfield at the
autumn assizes at Lancaster in 1758
"adapted his charge to the grand jury to the occasion, and
strongly urged to the jury the necessity of suppressing all such
combinations and conspiracies on any pretence whatsoever; gave
them an account of all the attempts of the like nature that had
been made at different times and in different parts of the kingdom, and told them that an active and vigilant execution of the
laws in being, had always been sufficient to suppress such attempts."
He issued a warrant for the arrest of nineteen stewards appointed
by the committee, and it was recommended that prosecutions
should be instituted against others. In 1783, in the case of The
King v. Eccles and Others, 3 it was held that a conspiracy to prevent a man carrying on his trade was a criminal offence. In 1796,
in the case of The King v. aawbeyy9 Grose, J., said obiter that,
though an individual workman might insist on a rise in wages, "if
several meet for the same purpose it is illegal, and the parties may
be indicted for a conspiracy."'" Iln1855, in the case of Hilton v.
Eckersley,4 CroniI)ton, J., said that all combinations which fettered
of Trade Unionism 66; combinations for this object were only trving to
enforce the law.
:';For instances of combinations to petition the Privy Council and
Parliament, which were assumed to be legal, see Webb, History of Trade
Unionism 65-6.
7
-Daniels, The Early English Cotton Industry 45-6.
'(1783) 1 Leach 274, 3 Dougl. K. B. 337-Lord Mansfield. C. J., said
at p. 339, "The conspiracy is to prevent Booth from working, the consequence ik poverty," and he refused the motion in arrest of judgment.
31:(1796) 6 Durn. & East 619.
"0(1796) 6 Durn. & Fast 619. 636.
41(1855) 6 F. & B. 47. 24 f.. J.Q. B. 353. 25 .. T. 0. S. 214. 20 J.P.
4. 1 Jur. N. S. 874. 3 C. L. Y. 1415; affd. (1856) 6 E.& 13.66.
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the free action of masters and men were "illegal and indictable at
common law.

42

But in 1855 it had become impossible to lay down the law quite
as broadly as this, since it had been enacted in 182543 that the act
of combining to raise or lower wages, or to affect hours of labour,
was no longer to be a criminal offence. Therefore it was not
true to say that all combinations of masters or men which fettered
their freedom of action were indictable conspiracies. For this
reason, in the case of Hilton v. Eckersley,44 Lord Campbell, C. J.,
and the court of Exchequer Chamber held that, though the agreements entered into by members of those combinations were void,
because, being in restraint of trade, they were contrary to public
policy, their members had not committed illegal acts of such a
kind that their commission in combination amounted to a conspiracy ;45 and this view of the law has been approved by the
House of Lords. 46 But it should be observed that Lord Campbell,
C. J., the court of Exchequer Chamber, and the House of Lords
have all adhered to the historic principle that trade ought to be
free from all restraints not sanctioned by law, and that therefore
agreements which attempt to impose those restraints are void because they are contrary to public policy.
This change in the attitude of the common law is an intelligible change having regard to the changes which had taken place in
economic ideas and in the statute law relating to combinations.
42"I think that combinations like that disclosed in the pleadings in this
case [a combination of masters] were illegal and indictable at common law,
as tending directly to impede and interfere with the free course of trade
and manufacture. The precedents of indictments for combinations of two or
more persons to raise wages, and for other offences of this nature, which
were all framed on the common law and not under any of the statutes on
the subject, sufficiently show what the common law was in this respect....
Combinations of this nature, whether on the part of workmen to increase,
or of masters to lower, wages were equally illegal." (1855) 6 E. and B.
47, 53, 24 L. J. Q. B. 353, 25 L. T. 0. S. 214, 20 J. P. 4, 1 Jur. N. S. 874,
3 C. L. R. 1415; affd. (1856) 6 E. & B. 66.
436 George IV, ch. 129.
44(1855) -6 E. & B. 47, 24 L. J. Q. B. 353, 25 L. T. 0. S. 214, 20 J. P.
4, 1 4Jur.
N. S. 874, 3 C. L. R. 1415; affd. (1856) 6 E. & B. 66.
5
Alderson, B., delivering the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber,
after holding that the contracts entered into by the combine were void,
because they were in restraint of trade, said at p. 75, "we do not mean to
say that they are illegal in the sense of being criminal and punishable. The
case does not require us: and we think we ought not to express any opinion
on that point."
41'Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A. C. 25. 39,
61 L. J. Q. B. 295, 66 L. T. 1, 56 J. P. 101, 40 W. R. 337, 8 T. L. R. 182, 7
Asp. M. L. C. 120.
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When Hilton v. Eckersley was decided, freedom of contract was
supposed to be the panacea for all social ills, and the maintenance
47
of that freedom was even said to be paramount public policy.
The legislature had freed from criminal taint certain combinations
to affect wages and other conditions of labour, and had repealed
the older statutes which made particular combinations criminal.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that eminent
lawyers should have denied that the formation of a combination
of masters or men which interfered with the freedom of trade had
ever been a criminal conspiracy at common law, and have maintained that the formation of these combinations only amounted to
a criminal conspiracy if they had been made illegal by statute.
This was the view of R. S. Wright (afterwards Wright, J.) in his
49
48
very able book on Criminal Conspiracies, and of Stephen, J.
But it was not the view of Sir William Erle. He maintained, as
we have seen, that the common law recognised the principle of the
freedom of trade subject only to restraints imposed by the law.50
It followed that combinations entered into with the intention of
depriving persons of that freedom were indictable conspiracies at
common law. The gist of his argument is contained in the following passages from his book. 5
"Every person has a right under the law, as between him and
his fellow subjects, to full freedom in disposing of his own labour
or his own capital according to his will. It follows that every other
person is subject to the correlative duty arising therefrom, and is
prohibited from any obstruction to the fullest exercise of this
right which can be made compatible with the exercise of similar
rights by others. Every act causing an obstruction to another in
the exercise of the right comprised within this description--done,
not in the exercise of the actor's own right, but for the purpose of
obstruction-would, if damage should be caused thereby to the
party obstructed, be a violation of this prohibition; and the violation of this prohibition by a single person is a wrong, to be
47

Per Jessel M. R. in Printing Co. v. Sampson, (1875) L. R. 19 Eq. 462,
465, 44 L. J. Ch. 705, 32 L. T. 354, 23 W. R. 463; for some remarks upon
this 48
dictum see 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3rd ed., 56.
Wright, Criminal Conspiracies 51-56; he says at p. 56 that "there is
not sufficient authority for concluding that before the 18th century there
was supposed to be any rule of common law that combinations for controlling masters or workmen were criminal, except when the combination
was for some purpose punishable under a statute expressly directed against
such combinations, or were for conduct punishable independently of combination."
493 Stephen, History of Criminal Law 209-10, 223-4.
5OAbove p. 371.
5t
Erle, The Law Relating to Trade Unions 12.
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remedied either by action or by indictment, as the case may be.
It is equally a wrong whether it be done by one or by many-subject to this observation, that a combination of many to do a
wrong, in a matter where the public has an interest, is a substantive offence of conspiracy. It is equally a wrong, whether the
obstruction be by means of an act unlawful in itself, on the part
of the party obstructing, or by means of an act not otherwise
unlawful."
In my opinion the authorities prove that historically this is the
correct view of the attitude of the common law.
Sir William Erle admits that numerous statutes were passed
at different periods to restrain combinations to raise or lower
wages; and he says very truly that "while they were in force they
tended to prevent a resort to the common law remedy for conspiracy. "52 On the other hand, Stephen was inclined to infer from
the existence of these statutes that "until they were passed the
conduct which they punish was not criminal." 53 In my opinion
this is not a true inference from their existence for the following
reason: When all aspects of trade were carefully regulated by the
legislature, in order to ensure fair wages, fair prices, and good
quality in the manufactured article, it is clear that any attempt to
vary the provisions made by the legislature by a combination of
masters or men was an illegal act, and that therefore a combination of persons to effect these objects was a criminal conspiracy.5The statutes passed by the legislature show that that principle was
constantly present to its mind. 55 But the statutes by which the
52 Erle, The Law Relating to Trade Unions 37.
533 Stephen, History of Criminal Law 210.
54
Above p. 372.
55
Thus the preamble to 12 George I, ch. 34 presupposes the existence
of this principle; it runs, "Whereas great numbers of weavers . . .have
lately formed themselves into unlawful clubs and societies and have presumed contrary to law to enter into combinations and make by-laws or
orders;" there is a similar preamble to 36 George III, ch. 111 which deals
with combinations of workmen employed in the manufacture of paper; the
same assumption is made in the preamble to the general combination Act
of 1799, 39 George III, ch. 81; it runs, "Whereas great numbers of journeymen manufacturers and workmen in various parts of this kingdom, have,
by unlawful meetings and combinations, endeavoured to obtain advance of
their wages, and to effectuate other illegal purposes; and the laws at
present in force against such unlawful conduct have been found to be inadequate to the suppression thereof, whereby it is become necessary that more
effectual provision should be made against such unlawful combinations;"
these preambles assume that these combinations are unlawful, and the preamble to 39 George III, ch. 81 does not say that the statutes referred to have
made these combinations illegal-it assumes that they have been passed
to enforce an existing rule.
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legislature attempted to effect these objects were, as a general rule,
statutes which dealt in detail with the regulation of particular
trades. They attempted to remedy abuses which had appeared in
the conduct of some particular trade; and the prohibitions which
they enact against combinations in that trade are merely a part of
the various provisions which they make for its regulation. 6 For
instance, a statute of Edward VI's reign, which penalized combinations of producers to raise the price of victuals, penalized also
combinations of workmen to raise their wages. 7 Similarly, the
eighteenth century statutes, which were directed against combinations of men,58 were statutes which dealt with particular trades;
and the clauses directed against combinations were part of a larger
scheme for the regulation of the particular trade.5 9 I think, therefore, that these statutes, and also the later more general statutes as
to combinations, presuppose, as Sir William Erie suggests, the
general principle of the common law that trade ought to be free
from restraints unless those restraints had been imposed by law;
and that they enforce that principle, first in the case of particular
trades, and later in the case of all trades, because it appeared that
its enforcement was necessary by reason of the prevalence of
combinations to raise or lower wages or to alter hours of labour,
which infringed it.
During the course of the eighteenth century, many of the old
rules directed to securing fair wages, fair prices, and good quality
in the manufactured article were rapidly becoming decadent. More
and more industry was coming to be organized on a capitalistic
basis; and the capitalists were demanding to be freed from obsolete restrictions. Wages were coming to be regulated simply by
the law of supply and demand. It is not surprising, therefore, that,
as this new organization of industry gained ground, and as the
old regulations which protected the workman decayed, combinations of these workmen should be formed in order to compel
employers to concede that fair wage which the older legislation
had endeavoured to compel them to give. Nor is it surprising
that combinations of employers should also be formed to regulate
p. 382-384.
572, 3 Edward VI, ch. 15.
58Before the statute of 1800, 39, 40 George III, ch. 106, no eighteenth
century statute contained a clause directed against combinations of masters,
below p. 387.
r9 Below p. 382-383.
56Below
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prices, and to resist the demands of their workmen. It was these
new conditions which produced the rise of the modern trade
unions and combinations of masters on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, the enactment of more general and more stringent
laws against these combinations of masters and men, which were
attempting to regulate wages and hours of work. These general
combination laws, which were passed in the last year of the eighteenth and the first year of the nineteenth century,60 did to a large
extent render unnecessary recourse to the common law principle
that trade ought to be free. It was not till these and the earlier statutes against combinations were repealed, and replaced by the new
legislation of 182461 and 1825,62 that it was necessary to ,appeal
to it. But, when the appeal was made to this principle, it was
called upon to operate in an environment wholly different to that
in which it had originated. It had originated at a time when the
conduct of all branches of trade was carefully regulated in order
to safeguard the interests of masters, of men, and of the state. It
was now called upon to settle the disputes which arose under a
system of industry wholly organized on a capitalistic system, and
dominated by the prevailing economic theory of laissez faire. It
is not surprising that it failed under these new conditions to settle
satisfactorily the relations of capital and labour, and that it was
superseded by a wholly new series of statutory regulations which
begin in 1871.63
But, though for very different reasons, at different periods in
our legal history, the principle of the common law that trade ought
to be free has been overshadowed by statutory limitations and
exemptions, it would be a mistake to suppose that it can be neglected. To some extent in the medieval period,6 and to a large
extent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,65 it helped
to prevent the imposition upon traders of arbitrary restraints
for which no legal authority could be shown. In the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries it supplied the background of prin6039 George III, ch. 81 dealt with combinations of men only; it was
replaced by 39, 40 George III, ch. 106; sec. 17 of the latter act penalized
combinations of masters to reduce wages, to alter hours of labour, or to
increase the quantity of work.
615 George IV, ch. 95.
626 George IV, ch. 129.
633 Stephen, History of Criminal Law 222-227.
64
A.bove p. 371-373.
6

5Above p. 373.
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ciple which inspired the legislation against combinations of masters and men."6 Later in the nineteenth century it helped to remedy
some of the worst consequences of that permission to combine
which the legislature had, under the influence of the classical
economists, granted without adequate consideration, and without any real understanding of the nature of the social and economic problems to which the new conditions of industry had
given rise.
But we must turn back to the eighteenth century, and examine the causes of the growth of these combinations of masters
and men, and the manner in which they were dealt with by the
legislature, during the period of transition through which the organization of industry was passing in that century. We shall see
that it is to this century of transition that we must look for the
Leginnings of the conditions in which the modern law as to these
combinations originated.
(2)

THE GROWTH OF COMXBINATIONS OF MASTERS AND MEN AND
THEIR STATUTORY REGULATION

Combinations of masters and men in particular trades originate
naturally, and are naturally suspect both by the public at large
and by the government; for, as Adam Smith says, 7 "people of the
same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public,
or in some contrivance to raise prices." He added that it was
impossible to prevent such meetings by law; and gave wise counsel when he said that "though the law cannot hinder people of
the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to
do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them
necessary." Unfortunately this wise counsel was not followed.
The growth of the capitalistic organization of industry and of
the factory system, the partial application which was made by the
legislature of Adam Smith's own theories as to the beneficial
effect of unrestricted liberty, and the dangers to life and property
and public order which were caused by the activities of combinations of men, produced legislation which succeeded indeed in impeding the growth and activities of those combinations, but not in
putting an end to them, because the policy pursued by the legisla06 Above p.373-375.
1171 Smith,

Wealth of Nations (Carman's Ed.) 130.
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ture had had the effect of rendering them necessary to the workmen.
During the eighteenth century many combinations of masters
and men in different trades were formed-though less was heard
of combinations of masters than of men.6" All were illegal at
common law as criminal conspiracies-as Lord Kenyon, C. J.,
pointed out in the case of R. v. Hammond and Webb.6
But
though both combinations of masters and men were treated in the
same way by the common law, they were treated very differently
by the statute law. During the eighteenth century a series of
statutes were passed to suppress combinations of men in different
trades.
In 1720 combinations of journeymen tail6rs in London "for
advancing their wages or for lessening their usual hours of work"
were declared to be illegal and punishable with imprisonment.70
Other provisions of the Act fixed the hours of work and rates
of wages,"' provided for the recovery of these wages by summary proceedings before justices of the peace,7 2 gave power to
3
Quarter Sessions to alter the rate of wages and hours of work7
and prescribed penalties for masters who gave a workman higher
wages than those fixed by the act.7 4 In 1725 combinations of wool
combers and weavers, of combers of jersey and wool, of frameworker knitters and makers of stockings, were declared to be illegal, and punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months.7 5 Other clauses of the act provided penalties
for spoiling work,76 quitting work in breach -of contract, 77 and
OSFor a combination of the coal owners of the Tyne and Wear as to
the employment of men in 1765 see Hammond, The Skilled Labourer 13;
for an agreement between these owners as to the output of the Northumberland coal mines known as the Newcastle Vend see ibid 24-5; 1 Smith,
Wealth of Nations (Cannan's Ed.) 68-9 explains why little was heard of
these combinations of masters; see also 3 Lipson, Economic History of
England 396, n. 4.
69(1799) 2 Esp. 719, 720.
707 George I St. 1, ch. 13, sec. 1.
7
'Sec. 2; further provisions were made by 8 George III, ch. 17, secs.

1, 4,726.
Sec. 4.
78
Sec. 5.
74

5ec. 7; more stringent provisions were made by 8 George III, ch. 17,
secs. 2 and 7.
7512 George I, ch. 34, secs. 1 and 8; for the history of the tumults
which preceded the act, and led to its enactment, see 3 Lipson, Economic
History of England 392-5.
76

Sec. 2.
77Sec. 2.
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assaulting or threatening masters.7 8 Justices of the peace were
given power to enforce the payment of wages, TM and payment
of wages by way of truck was prohibited so In 1749 the
provisions of the act of 1725 as to the combinations of the
workmen mentioned in that act were extended to a number of
other industries.8 ' The Act also contained provisions dealing with
various abuses and frauds committed by workmen in these industries.8 2 In 1773 provision was made for the regulation of the
wages of persons employed in the weaving of silk. 3 Masters or
workmen who asked or took more or less wages than those fixed
were made liable, the masters to a fine of £50, and the workmen
84
to a fine of 40/- or to imprisonment if the fine were not paid.
The same penalties were provided for workmen who entered into
combinations to raise wages, and who, for this purpose, persuaded workmen to quit their employers, or who assembled in any
numbers beyond ten in order to frame or deliver petitions as to
wages, except petitions to Quarter Sessions."' Another clause of
the Act prohibited silk weavers from having in their service more
than two apprentices."" In 1777 combinations of journeymen hatters were penalized, 7 together with various other offences such
as spoiling goods or quitting work in breach of contract."" The
act also provided that a master must employ one journeyman
hatter for every apprentice which he took, provided that a sufficient number of journeymen hatters who had served as apprentices
were available. 0 In 1796 combinations of persons employed in
the manufacture of paper were prohibited. 0 The act also made
regulations as to hours of work."'
7
'Sec. 6.
79
Sec. 3.
8
sSec. 4.

8122 George II, ch. 27, sec. 12; the industries to which the act of 1725
was extended were: journeymen dyers, journeymen hot pressers, all persons
employed in the wool manufacture, journeymen servants workmen and
labourers employed in the making of felts or hats, and in the manufactures
of silk, mohair, furs, hemp, flax, linen, cotton, fustian, iron and leather, or
any 82
manufactures made up of those materials.
Secs. 1, 2, 7.
8313 George III, ch. 68.
84
Secs. 2 and 3.
85
Sec. 3; this would seem to show that combinations to present petitions to the King or to Parliament were regarded as legal, above p. 374-375.
8
sSec. 7.
8717 George III, ch. 55, sees. 3 and 4.
88
Sec. 3.
8
sSec. 2.
s'36 George III, ch. 111, secs. 1, 2, 4, 5.
O1 Sec. 3.
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It should be observed that all these Acts which penalize combinations of men differ, as the Webbs have pointed out,92 from the
later general combination Acts of 1799 and 1800. They were
passed primarily to regulate industry; and the clauses dealing with
combinations were incidental to this main purpose, which, as we
have seen, is contained in the other clauses which all these acts
contain.
"It was assumed to be the business of Parliament and the law
courts to regulate the conditions of labour; and combinations
could, no more than individuals, be permitted to interfere in disputes for which a legal remedy was provided. The object primarily aimed at by the statutes was not the prohibition of combinations, but the fixing of wages, the prevention of embezzlement
or damage, the enforcement of the contract of service, and the
proper arrangements for apprenticeship."9
But, in spite of these statutes, combinations of men became
more frequent and more permanent as the eighteenth century
progressed. 4 The reason was that, under the influence of the
capitalistic organization of industry, of the rise of the factory system, and of the new economic doctrines which condemned the old
regulations of and restrictions on the conduct of industry, Parliament was gradually ceasing to regulate the relations of masters
and men.9 5 The repeal in 1757 of the act passed in 1756, which
provided for the settlement of the wages of weavers by the justices of the peace, shows that Parliament was exchanging "its
policy of medieval protection for one of administrative nihilism."9 "
Therefore the workers were left to shift for themselves. They
were obliged to combine in self-defence, so that Parliament had
done exactly what Adam Smith had said that it ought not to do ;9'
it had rendered these combinations necessary. The result was
that they became so numerous and powerful that it was quite
impossible to suppress them. The men began to form permanent
trade unions, and the masters naturally formed combinations to
resist their demands. 8 These trade unions and combinations
'12Webb, History of Trade Unionism 65.
!J3Webb, History of Trade Unionism 65.
9'4"The laws against combinations were powerless to check the development of trade unionism.... In spite of common law and statute law trade
unionism persisted throughout the eighteenth century, and bequeathed its
traditions to the unions of the nineteenth century," 3 Lipson, Economic History of England 396-7.
'3 Lipson, Economic History of England 386-7.
•-Webb, History of Trade Unionism 51.
UAbove p. 381.
:"For an instance of a union of masters which originated in this way,
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tended to give a solidarity to the aims of the working classes, to
accentuate the division into the two separate classes of masters
and men which the new industrial organization was creating, and
to embitter their relations.?
All the reasons which had induced the legislature to forbid
combinations of men in particular trades applied with greater force
to the formation of the larger and more permanent trade unions
which the policy of laissez faire adopted by Parliament had rendered inevitable. And those reasons were reinforced by the fear
that these trade unions were inspired by French revolutionary principles. 0' These were the causes which led to the passing of the
first general combination Act in 1799,11 and they account for the
character of its provisions.
The history of the enactment of this statute is as follows: In
April, 1799, the master mill wrights addressed a petition to the
House of Commons, which complained of a dangerous combination amongst their men, and of the inadequacy of the existing
laws to suppress its activities, and asked for legislation. A bill
was introduced and passed the House of Commons, but it was
dropped in the Lords, because a more comprehensive bill dealing
with all combinations had been introduced by Pitt. This bill,
which was modelled on the Act of 1796 dealing with combinations
in the paper trade,102 became law only twenty-four days after its
introduction in the House of Commons." 3 In outline its provisions were as follows:
All contracts made between workmen for obtaining an advance
of wages, or decreasing their hours of work, or the quantity of
their work, were declared to be illegal ;104 and the formation of
such a contract was made a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment. 10 It was also made a criminal offence for members
of such a combination to induce others not to take employment,
or to leave their employment, or to hinder masters from hiring
what workmen they pleased. 00 Attendance at, or inducing others
see 30 Lipson, Economic History of England 408.
9Hammond, The Town Labourer 8-9; cf. Webb, History of Trade
Unionism
41-2, 46-7.
0
12
Hammond, The Town Labourer 93-4.
10139 George II, ch. 81.
10236 George III, ch. 111; above p. 383.
lolHammond, The Town Labourer 115-124; Webb, History of Trade
Unionism 69-70.
10439 George III, ch. 81, sec. 1.
30
2 Sec. 2.

'°GSec. 3.
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to attend at, meetings held for the purpose of entering into or
maintaining these combinations; or subscribing to, or collecting
money from workmen or others for the furtherance of, these
combinations; were also made criminal offences' 0 7 Contributions made for any of the purposes prohibited by the act were
to be divided amongst the subscribers within three months; and,
if not so divided, they were to be forfeited. 108 Treasurers and
others who had these monies in their hands were compelled to
answer on oath to any information preferred against them either
in a court of equity or by the attorney-general.' 09 Offenders
against the act could be compelled to give evidence; but if so
compelled they were not to be liable to any of the penalties of the
Act. 110 Appeals from a conviction could be made to Quarter
Sessions;"' but its decision was final, 1 2 and the proceedings were
not to be removed into the King's Bench by writ of certiorari." 3
Existing legislation as to combinations of manufacturers or journeymen or workmen, as to the powers of the justices to settle disputes between masters and men, and to settle rates of wages, was
not to be affected by the act ;" nor was the act to empower masters to employ men contrary to the provisions of any existing
0
act." 5
In the following year many petitions protesting against the
Act were presented from all parts of the country. Consequently
the whole question was reconsidered ;116 and the result of this
reconsideration was the Act of 1800,"7 which repealed the act
of 1799. The main provisions of the act of 1799 were re-enacted;
but there were some important amendments which were due to
the numerous petitions which had been presented against it.118
Offenders were to be tried, not by a single justice, but by two
' 07 Secs. 4 and 5.

1'0 Sec. 6.
'09Sec. 7.

11°Sec. 9.
'Sec. 13.
1-2Sec. 14.
2.ISec.13.
" 4 Sec. 15.

"'Sec. 16.
"0GHammond, The Town Labourer 125-6; Webb, History of Trade
Unionism 70-71.
11739, 40 George III, ch. 106.
" 58Stephen is not quite accurate when lie says, 3 History of Criminal
Law, 206-7, that "there was hardly any substantial difference between the
two acts."
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justices;19 and justices who were masters in the particular trade
in reference to which an offence was alleged to be committed,
Combinations between masters or
were disabled from acting.'12
other persons for reducing wages, altering hours of work, or increasing the quantity of work were made offences;

2

' and provi-

sion was made for settling disputes between masters and men by
arbitration.122 On the other hand, it was provided that, though
masters must not employ workmen contrary to any existing Acts,
a justice of the peace could license such employment if the workmen in any trade refused to work for reasonable wages,1 23 and in
12 4
certain other events set out in the act.

These acts are, as we have seen, very different in their character from the earlier combination acts which applied to particular
trades. The prohibition of combinations is not part of a general
scheme for the regulation of particular industries. It is a general
prohibition; and so far was it from being part of a scheme for
the regulation of industry, that the need for this general prohibition was caused by the repeal or decadence of the old regulations,
and the failure of Parliament to put any new regulations in their
place. 1 2' In fact these acts show that Parliament had wholly failed
to appreciate the reasons for the rise of those large and permanent
combinations of men. 1 2 Though this legislation, like the earlier
legislation, impeded the growth and hampered the activities of
these combinations, it did not succeed in suppressing them, and
it did succeed in embittering the relations of masters and men.
We shall now see that the main reason why Parliament wholly
failed to regulate satisfactorily these relations was the influence
of the predominant economic doctrine of laissez faire, which the
masters had deduced from Adam Smith's teaching. That influence prevented Parliament from appreciating the fact that, in addition to the merely negative policy of repealing the old regula11Sec. 5.
120 Sec. 16.
121 Sec. 17.
122 Sec. 18.
123 Sec. 15.
4
12 A refusal "to work for any particular person or persons, or to work
with any particular persons," or if the workmen "by refusing to work for
any cause whatsoever, or by misconducting themselves when employed to
work, in any manner impede or obstruct the ordinary course of any manufacture, trade or business, or endeavour to injure the person or persons
carrying on the same."
122 Above p. 384.
GAbove p. 381-382.
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tions, a positive policy was needed which would have adapted the
spirit of those old regulations to the new industrial conditions.
(3).

THE SOCIAL AND

ECONOMIC

EFFECTS OF THIS STATU-

TORY REGULATION OF COMBINATIONS

OF MASTERS AND MEN.

During the greater part of the eighteenth century the legislature had not abandoned the attempt to settle on an equitable basis
the relations of masters and men. But, with the spread of the
capitalistic organization of industry, and with the growing prevalence of the factory system, the economic theory that the state
should interfere as little as possible with industrial relations had
gathered force. This theory was expressed in classic form in
Adam Smith's book,2 7 and his statement gave it enormous impetus.
As interpreted by the manufacturers, who controlled the legislature, it taught that all the old regulations which governed the relations of masters and men should be abolished; that the manufacturers should be left to conduct their business as they pleased;
and that any attempt to regulate wages was not only ill advised,
but as impossible of success as an attempt to alter one of nature's
physical laws.' 2 The surrender of the legislature to these views
was not only a refusal to attempt to adjust the relations of masters and men on equitable terms. It was also in effect a refusal
to .attempt to solve the social and economic problems which the
industrial revolution was bringing in its train. This refusal,
though it enabled the manufacturers to accumulate wealth, had
some very evil social and economic effects.
In the first place, it tended to convince the working classes
that appeals to the courts and to Parliament were useless. It was
not till the proceedings which they took in the courts to enforce
the old laws directed to securing a living wage and fair industrial conditions had failed, -" it was not till the petitions which
Smith, Wealth of Nations (Cannan's Ed.) 184-5.
"The political economists, in many instances at least, wrote as if
an attempt to alter the rate of wages by combinations of workmen was like
an attempt to alter the weight of the air by tampering with barometers.
It was said that the price of labour depended like the price of other commodities, solely upon supply and demand, and that it could not be altered
artificially," 3 Stephen, History of Criminal Law 211.
29
For those appeals to the courts see Webb. Historv of Trade Unionism 57-60; thus in 1802 the weavers in the West of England combined
1272
28

with the Yorkshire weavers to appoint an attorney to prosecute employers
who infringed the laws relating to their trade-"the result was that Parliament hastily passed an act, 43 George III, ch. 136. suspending these statutes
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they presented to Parliament to secure the same objects had been
rejected, 3 ° that the workmen were driven to take other means to
remedy their grievances. The failure of their appeals to the courts
and to Parliament caused their combinations to gather size and
strength, and to demand, not the enforcement of the old laws, but
radical and even revolutionary reforms. Thus, the refusal of the
courts and Parliament to act tended to sap that law abiding instinct, which had been a marked characteristic of the English people during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries;"'. for that
refusal meant the abandonment of any attempt to submit the relations of masters and Tnen to any effective legal control. The
result was that disputes between masters and men were withdrawn
from the arbitrament of the law, and left to be decided by the
effective forces at the disposal of the contending parties. The
fact that it was possible in 1906 to pass a statute which perpetrated the enormous injustice of freeing trade unions of masters
or men from liability for torts "' is, I think, due primarily to the
prevalent laissez faire doctrines, which induced Parliament, at the
end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, to refuse to set up any legal machinery for the equitable
adjustment of industrial disputes.
Secondly, and consequently, a new antagonism between the
employing class and the workmen sprang up. Capital and labour
began to regard one another as enemies. Class war was fomented. 133 This was particularly dangerous at a time when the
new democratic theories were gathering strength. Adam Smith
had remarked that "the inhabitants of a town, being collected into
one place, can easily combine together ;,134 and there is no doubt
that it was the population of Paris and other French towns, which
in order to put a stop to the prosecutions," ibid. 57; similarly prosecutions
were instituted for infringements of the apprenticeship statutes, ibid. 59;.
cf. 3 Cunningham, Industry and Commerce 635-6.
13°See Webb, History of Trade Unionism 52, 53-4, 56-7, 60-61; 3 Cunningham, Industry and Commerce 635-638, 658-660.
31Thus 3 Cunningham, Industry and Commerce 638, speaking of the
rejection of the petitions of the weavers against the repeal of the wage
clauses of 5 Elizabeth ch. 4, secs. 11, 12, 31, says, "it is important to
observe that in this agitation the weavers were maintaining a strictly conservative attitude; they asked to have the law of the land put in execution,
and they could not but be deeply incensed at the line taken, both by the
legislature and by the magistrates who were charged with the administration of the law."
1326 Edward VII ch. 47, sec. 4 (1)-Trade Disputes Act, 1906.

"3'Webb, History of Trade Unionism 73-4.

"111Smith, Wealth of Nations (Cannan's Ed.) 127.
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was the moving force behind those democratic theories with which
the success of the French Revolution was infecting Europe. In
England the growth of old towns and the rise of new urban districts, which the industrial revolution was rapidly creating, made
for the spread of democratic theories and the revolutionary proposals which came in their train.
Thirdly, the laissez faire attitude which Parliament took up at
the bidding of the economists not only prevented a fair settlement
of the claims of capital and labour under the new industrial conditions, it made Parliament indifferent to the growth of the enormous social evils, which its refusal to regulate the consequences of
the industrial revolution was causing. The growth of old towns
and the rise of new urban centres were creating new problems of
public health and public education, which the unreformed Parliament disregarded,"'5 partly no doubt because the eighteenth century machinery of local and central government was unequal to
dealing with the new problems, but mainly because it considered
that the laissez faire policy, which they were being taught to consider to be the orthodox attitude in economic questions, was also
the orthodox attitude in all other allied social questions.
For all these reasons the treatment by the statesmen of the
eighteenth century of these industrial problems, and more especially their treatment by the statesmen of the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries who had fallen under the spell of the
classical economists, left a legacy of troublesome problems to their
successors. The complexity of those problems has been aggravated rather than solved by the increase in the power of the democratic elements in the constitution.
1353 Cunningham, Industry and Commerce 628-9, 807.
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